• William Gumede-Facilitator and Executive Chairperson of Democracy Works Foundation
• Nomboniso Gasa– Politics, Culture, Gender Specialist
• Ayesha Kajee– Senior Political Analyst
• Lorette Tredoux– Executive Director: Governance & Intergovernmental Relations, SALGA

The answer is that in some countries in Africa overall democracy has deepened, in others aspects of democracy have been strengthened and in others previous democratic gains have been reversed whether in parts or overall.

The answer is that in some countries in Africa overall democracy has deepened, in others aspects of democracy have been strengthened and in others previous democratic gains have been reversed whether in parts or overall.

Since African independence from colonialism starting in the late 1950s, three core African countries have consistently performed better in democracy building than others: they are Mauritius, Cape Verde and Botswana. A second group including South Africa, Tunisia, Ghana, Namibia and Senegal have more recently become democratic.  Of these two groups of genuine African democratic countries Mauritius, Cape Verde and Botswana have certainly over the years been consistently the most democratic overall.

The Constitutional Court in Johannesburg was the scene of a unique submission on Tuesday 9 February 2016. Opposition parties Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Public Protector took President Zuma to the highest court in the land over illegal upgrades to his private property, Nkandla in Kwa-Zulu Natal.

The second submission was his disregard for the Public Protector. The Chapter 9 institution found several irregularities in the state- sponsored upgrades to Zuma’s private homestead and recommended he pay back a portion of the costs.

During the hearing, lawyers of the President took a critical step to admit that the recommendations of the watchdog Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, were constitutionally binding and should not have been ignored by the President nor the National Assembly.

A mea-culpa of note. This is an about turn that is rarely seen by a sitting Head of State, on the international scene, let alone on our African continent.

This is however not the first time a sitting Head of State has been challenged at this level. In 1998 then president Nelson Mandela became the first head of state since the dawn of democracy 4 years earlier, forced to defend his political actions in the Constitutional Court. He won the case against the national rugby boss Dr. Louis Luyt.

In 2002, the Constitutional Court upheld the right of HIV+ pregnant women’s to access healthcare to prevent mother to child transmission. The case was brought by the civil society organisation, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) against the incumbent President Thabo Mbeki and Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang who lost.

President Jacob Zuma has been forced to backtrack twice in recent months. First there was the bizarre overnight dismissal of a capable and unpliable Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene on 9 December 2015, which led to public furore and unprecedented market unrest. In his place, Zuma appointed the inexperienced parliamentarian, David van Rooyen to the critical position, leading to further anxiety and disbelief.

Seemingly bewildered by the outcry from many corners of political, business and civil society, after only 4 days, Zuma re-appointed Nene’s predecessor, the much respected Minister Pravin Gordhan on 13 December.

The winner on the 9^th of February, even before the court declares its findings, is democracy because citizens, through their representatives, were able to challenge the President and the executive arms of Government. Their disregard for the Public Protectors recommendations forced their lawyers to concede their errors when tested by the court in a hearing that was beamed into every household in the nation via radio and television. Justice, though in the making, was seen to be done.

It is a victory for democracy and citizens. Public outcry over Nkandla has been considerable and consistent with #PayBackTheMoney protests dominating public spaces, parliament and media platforms for months, nay, years.

Civil and political society responded in kind with the EFF leading a new style of confrontational politics in Parliament which led to the well-publicized and embarrassing moments of heavy-handedness on the part of the State in Parliament. Footage of which was beamed across the globe within minutes.

It is a victory for our democratic institutions and underscores the independence of South Africa’s judiciary and now, again, the role and position of the Public Protector. It showcases the vibrancy of political contestation in South Africa and that truth can be spoken to power, and power held to account.

The Constitutional Court judges furthermore have the opportunity to clearly re-emphasise the role of parliament as a check on executive power. From proceedings thus far it appears clear that Parliament has been left wanting in the Nkandla case and was used by the Executive.

The ruling by the Constitutional Court will prove that Government and the Presidency can be wrong, perhaps often are, and should be monitored and held to account when they act in contradiction to the Constitution and law. It proves that they can, in fact be held to account, through citizen action first and foremost, by civic and political organisations, by independent democratic institutions and by an independent judiciary.

This should inspire South Africans – in particular the dormant well-to-do sections of society to play a more active and participatory role in society.

The about-turns by President Zuma will hopefully set a precedent where politicians, our representatives, no longer shy away from admitting mistakes and stating when they have erred.

Isn’t this true leadership?

One would hope that it doesn’t have to take the Constitutional Court to motivate them to do so and that an active citizenry with public outcry suffices.

Municipal elections are due to be held this year with some predicting increased voter apathy and voter anger at the ruling ANC. There are predictions of them losing important metropole municipalities which may have inspired the changes mentioned above to save face and maintain the status quo.

Electoral considerations and public outcry fundamentally should motivate parties and leaders to change their ways. It is but one of the institutions citizens have to hold parties and leaders to account.

One hopes that an inquisitive and thorough media raising matters of concern or exposing mistakes or outright nefarious leadership is enough for political parties to hold their leaders to account and avoid egg on their face and possible electoral damage.

In light of these developments, the State of the Nation address by President Zuma in Cape Town on 11 February is perhaps the most important he will ever give. A poor showing by President Zuma will further damage the ANC, government as a whole and brand South Africa.

It is a great thing that South Africa’s young democracy has traditions and institutions that bear fruit as check and balance on power.

Two men got out the car and knocked at  the door saying they were the police. Sikhosiphi ‘Bazooka’ Rhadebe, the Chairman of a community group opposing an Australian mining venture on South Africa’s Wild Coast, was then shot with eight bullets to  the head. He died on March 22 this year defending his son.

Trouble has been brewing on the Wild Coast for a decade now. Nelson Mandela’s ancestral lands are a region remarkable for their voluminous, thundering beauty arching over bowling green hills. They are also home to vast mineral deposits, and Bazooka Rhadebe’s village of Xolobeni in Mbizana municipality sits on the front line. Australian company ‘Mineral Commodities Limited’ (MRC) has been trying to create a 22 km by 1.5km open cast titanium mine in the dunes that will alter land the Pondo people have inhabited since 500 AD.

Today however marks a global day of awareness where activists in South Africa, Australia and the UK are standing up against the activities of MRC in Xolobeni, and highlighting a rural community’s right to prevent mining on their ancestral lands. Protests are taking place outside MRC’s offices in Cape Town, while South African and Australian NGO’s are orchestrating a media campaign.

Meanwhile on-line pressure group Avaaz is targeting UK board member millionaire property investor Graham Edwards to divest from MRC.

The Xolobeni mining proposal has been splitting the community into two blocks ever since its inception; those that support the venture, such as local MRC black empowerment partner ‘ Xolco ‘ and the Amadiba tribal authority chief, and those that see it as wrecking ball for the pristine beaches, estuaries and endangered flora and fauna.

Violent attacks, arson, attempted murder and night raids on anti-mining community activists in Mbizana have increased dramatically in the last year, while Radebe himself called two other members of his Amadiba Crisis Committee hours before his death to warn of a hit list at which he was at the top. Even journalists who attended Radebe’s funeral ended up hospitalised after being beaten with machetes, while the local police refused to arrest any members of the mob responsible.

Although it has been reported that an employee of one of MRC’s other operations in South Africa was implicated in one of last year’s murder attempts, there is no evidence currently to suggest that MRC is responsible for Radebe’s death. However, it is clear that members of the community are furious at the Amadiba Crisis Committee action’s in blocking mining licence applications.

Hobson’s Choice?

Those in support of the venture point to the mine as a fast track to economic development – Statistics SA’s 2011 census reports that 85 percent of Mbizana’s adult residents are unemployed and rely on government grants and subsistence farming, while most residents live on R50 (£.2.20) a day. If the mine comes, the community have been told that a proper road will arrive, people will be employed, and the mine will help one of the regions of South Africa with the highest rates of unemployment.

The local population therefore seems to face Hobson’s choice; take this 22km stretch of mine, or continue with little assistance at all. However given what people already know about mines in South Africa, large numbers of the community seem to prefer the later.

Murky mining in South Africa

In the last five years, miners in South Africa have seen fellow workers massacred by police at Marikana, a mine shaft collapse in the province of Mpumalanga trapping 100 workers and tens of thousands of miners who contracted the incurable lung disease silicosis, join a class action to sue mining companies for failing to protect their workers from silica dust.

Mining has also lead to environmental degradation across the country, the displacement of communities, the destruction of livelihoods such as fishing and farming, and largescale pollution from the mine dust produced in estuaries and water supplies.

Australia’s aid strategy for Africa is unconcerned. It’s Foreign Minister has stated that mining makes “a substantial contribution to economic development and poverty alleviation”, and as such Australia has cut its aid to Africa and replaced it with a renewed commitment to mining on the continent. Australian mining companies are now the most rapidly expanding of all mining investors in Africa.

However, according to a report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 380 people have died in mining accidents or in offsite skirmishes connected to Australian mining companies in African countries since 2004, while multiple Australian mining companies are accused of negligence, unfair dismissal, violence and environmental law-breaking across the continent.

The Shore Break

An extraordinary South African documentary called The Shore Break has though captured the Samson and Goliath nature of the struggle between Xolobeni’s grass roots activists and this big Australian multi-national.

There is a moment in the documentary where a toothless man is inspecting a printed letter posted on a wooden gate addressed to the local community from the mining company. It says please respond by fax or email within 24hrs. The man grins. ‘Where do we have such facilities?’ he says.

Global days of activism, such as today, therefore highlight the power of those who do have such facilities, in helping intimidated communities such as Xolobeni’s in spreading the message of activism for them.

*This article was published in The Huffington Post. To view the article on their website click here. 

http://www.r2k.org.za/2016/03/23/amadiba-assassination/

The elections shifted the terrain of change from the domination of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in its various forms and its civil society allies to the dictates of a re-energised Zanu-PF.

The election result has mortgaged Zimbabwe’s future transition to the ruling party’s protracted and murky succession politics, and the knives are out or being sharpened in readiness for the day when President Robert Mugabe is no longer in power — either because he has died or is too incapacitated by old age or illness to continue ruling.

The transition will be dictated by two factors: economic policy and the inter-generational political fight.

Mugabe’s 10-point plan on the economy indicates a return to orthodox neoliberal economic policies. The International Monetary Fund’s Staff-Monitored Programme (SMP) and its debt repayment strategy have been adopted, the Supreme Court has made a ruling affecting the common law that makes it easier for employers to terminate workers’ employment, and the taxation on beneficiaries of restituted land is being enforced.

On the political front, it is a case of “talk left, walk right” as the ruling party continues to espouse the radical rhetoric of indigenisation to keep the voting masses on side while at the same time government policies indicate a return to neoliberal, market economics.

The intense jockeying for power and the resultant internecine struggles in the ruling party over who will eventually take over from Mugabe are marked by, among other competing factional interests, the struggle between the liberation-war old guard and the younger, post-liberation generation, known as the G40 (Generation 40).

Does the capitulation to neoliberal economic policies and the political signals emanating from the government indicate that Zanu-PF is undergoing a transformation process similar to that experienced by Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution) in terms of policy and political direction? Tanzania’s ruling party, which once espoused Julius Nyerere’s Ujuamaa socialist policies, later pursued economic liberalisation and free-market reforms under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Zimbabwe has entered into a lengthy and difficult transition period in which internal Zanu-PF politics is a key determinant, and traditional good governance notions and the conceptualisation of civil society needs to be restructured to adequately respond to the shifting terrain.

Soon after the 2013 elections, Zimbabwe initiated a re-engagement plan with international financial institutions and western countries in a bid to normalise decades of sour relations. The most notable pointers have been the successful completion of the first and second stages of the IMF Staff-Monitored Programme and ultimately the endorsement of the country’s debt- and arrears-clearance strategy in Lima, Peru.

IMF Press Release No. 15/175 of April 21, 2015 observes the shift in macro-economic policy:

"Despite economic and financial difficulties, the Zimbabwean authorities have made progress in implementing their macroeconomic and structural reform programs, particularly regarding clarifying the indigenization policy, restoring confidence and improving financial sector soundness, and strengthening public financial management. During 2015, the authorities’ policy reform agenda will continue to focus on: (a) reducing the primary fiscal deficit to raise Zimbabwe’s capacity to repay; (b) restoring confidence in the financial system; (c) improving the business climate; and (d) garnering support for an arrears clearance strategy."

Mugabe’s State of the Nation address in September 2015 introduced a 10-point plan whose key objective was to make it easier to do business in Zimbabwe, assuage investors’ fears and reinforce the notion that the country is open and ready for business.

Independent Zimbabwean blogger Takura Zhangazha summarises the plan as a brief end to ideological ambiguity: “For radical nationalists [and] indigenisation supporters, this speech will, therefore, be a disappointing one,” he writes. “For liberals and free market advocates, it will be sweet music to their ears … government’s economic template is essentially neoliberal”.

While there have been public spats between a few government ministers over the direction of the country’s economic policy, the message from key state institutions such as the presidency and treasury has been clear and consistently in favour of neoliberal economic reform.

Reserve Bank Governor Dr John Mangudya’s statement that Zimbabwe has no alternative but to pay its creditors solidifies the policy change argument. The government is implementing orthodox economic reforms to unlock new funding for capital projects in order to resuscitate the struggling economy.

But the treasury is still, obviously, in trouble. The repeated postponement and late payment of public service salaries last year and the government’s failure to pay civil servants their December salaries and annual bonuses indicate that all is not well on the financial front. The army and police were, of course, paid on time — the government would never risk alienating these two essential pillars of its power.

Zimbabwe’s political landscape has been experiencing seismic shifts of tectonic magnitude in recent months as competing political factions in Zanu-PF seek to strategically reposition themselves to ascend to state power. Mugabe’s advanced age and growing speculation over his health adds currency to the succession debate among Zimbabweans in general.

In Zanu-PF, the succession debates saw the purging of Vice-President Joyce Mujuru at the party’s December 2014 congress and the elevation of her long-time nemesis Emmerson “the Crocodile” Mnangagwa to the vice-presidency. And now the factional fights have shifted, pitting Mnangagwa’s “Team Lacoste” of liberation-war veterans against the younger, post-liberation G40, who are backed by Mugabe’s wife, Grace. (Team Lacoste, incidentally, gets its name from the fact that the Lacoste clothing label’s logo is a crocodile).

Grace Mugabe has been holding rallies countrywide and, at one stage, doled out agricultural implements from a Brazil loan facility to Zanu-PF supporters, much to the chagrin of the opposition.

Mnangagwa’s supporters and those who back Grace Mugabe have clashed in the media and at national events, and a new slogan has emerged in Zanu-PF: Munhu wese kuna Amai (Every person should render support to the First Lady). The G40 faction argues that by supporting Grace Mugabe, they are demonstrating their loyalty to her husband.

Given the events leading to Zanu-PF’s 2014 December congress and the purging of Mujuru and her allies, the tone of Zanu-PF’s 2015 December conference was set by its political commissar and the head of the party’s powerful commissariat, Saviour Kasukuwere, who berated unnamed senior officials at a rally in Chiweshe district for wanting to remove the president before his term ends. The recent Chiweshe rally, held by Grace Mugabe, was a daggers all-out affair against Mnangagwa as speaker after speaker from the G40 took turns to berate Team Lacoste. The editorial U-turn by the Zanu-PF supporting Herald newspaper, which reported on the event but had previously blocked coverage of the G40, also indicates which faction has the upper hand at the moment.

Zanu-PF’s December 2015 conference saw Mugabe praising the party’s commissariat and the Women’s league, led by his wife, for doing a sterling job. These endorsements by the president seem to indicate that he has given a tacit thumbs-up to the G40.

The Women’s League passed a key resolution at the conference to have a woman represented in the party’s presidium (it’s supreme, four-person decision-making body) — and while the resolution was not formally endorsed by the conference the mere fact that it was raised may have a bearing on the succession dynamics within Zanu-PF.

The emergence of the G40 and the traction it has gained in Zanu-PF may speak to a process of political reform within Zanu-PF. The seemingly imminent departure of Mugabe necessitates this institutional change in the party as competing factions seek to strategically position themselves for the day when he is no longer in power.

Constitutionally, Mugabe is left with one possible re-election in 2018 (by which time he would have been president for 38 years), but his advanced age (he will turn 92 on February 21 this year) and reportedly failing health means an act of God may usher in a new era or prevent him from seeking re-election in 2018. A post-Mugabe period has become a reality — it is just a question of time — and it has led to intense jockeying and political positioning by his aspiring heirs.

The reported alliance of Grace Mugabe and the G40 has made Zanu-PF succession politics murkier than ever and the inconclusiveness of Zanu-PF’s December 2015 conference as to a clear winner between the G40 and Team Lacoste points to a continuation of the succession conundrums in the party.

What has become apparent is that the remaining old guard in Zanu-PF face a generational revolt from the G40 young Turks.The revolt has become more apparent given the events leading up to the first meeting of Zanu-PF’s politburo this year (held on 10 February) after the party’s December 2015 confrence. The G40, through Higher and Tertiary Education Minister and politburo member Jonathan Moyo, defiantly launched a social media blitzkrieg against Mnangagwa and his Team Lacoste with apparent impunity, despite Mugabe’s ban on party members abusing social media for factional reasons.

In addition, Sarah Mahoka, the Women’s League secretary of finance, recently challenged Mnangagwa to come clean on his presidential ambitions and warned that he could risk becoming a victim of his own machinations if he did not publicly declare his interest in succeeding Mugabe.

A key outcome of these political events has been the delegitimation of the liberation narrative — the ideological preserve of the war veterans and securocrats in justifying their authoritarian rule. This mirrors the events leading to the ouster of Mujuru and her supporters.

For now, the G40 will have to contend with Grace Mugabe playing godmother and using her influence with her husband to elbow out potential aspirants to the leadership from the old guard. On the other hand, Mnangagwa and Team Lacoste are caught up in the dilemma of trying to avoid the same fate as Mujuru while at the same time avoiding the danger of being extinguished from the political scene if they do not act.

While Zimbabwe’s politics has become a “Game of Thrones” and its economic orientation signifies an ideological U-turn, the transition is proving to be a very messy affair.

The major challenge now for civil society is how to navigate the dangerous currents swirling about in this destabilising period of transition and to reposition itself to help take Zimbabwe into a new era of a vibrant and truly liberatory, human-rights based, participatory democracy.

*This article has been published by the SABC and can be viewed on their website here.

The drought scorched Brazil’s agriculture sector, hitting exports, income and jobs.

The Brazilian government also lost its grip on fiscal discipline. Public debt spiraled out of control. State-owned enterprises, states (provinces) and municipalities managed by political untouchables built up huge inefficiencies, waste and debt.

White elephant, pork-barreling and patronage infrastructure and ‘development’ projects further undermined public finances.

In Brazil the political elite lacked the will to curb public spending – when it was desperately necessary to stabilise public finances.

The Brazilian currency was volatile. Imports became expensive. Inflation ballooned. Consumption by Brazil’s rising middle classes had helped fuel growth. The rising inflation reduced consumer spending.

The fall in commodity prices, China’s slowdown and the impact of the US quantitative easing policy, which drove industrial country foreign investors to move from emerging markets for what they deemed to be ‘safer’ industrial markets, like the US, all hit the Brazilian economy.

Public corruption in Brazil rose uncontrollably. Finally, the Brazilian government, because of the stench corruption, lost credibility among the markets, and its own supporters. The markets did not believe the Brazilian government’s reform promises and its own supporters questioned whether its intended reforms were in the public’s best interests or merely for patronage purposes.

The final push over the cliff for the Brazilian economy was when rating agencies assigned the country junk status.

Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff in early January 2016 admitted that her government’s “biggest mistake” was to underestimate the scale of the economic crisis the country experienced.

While Brazil experienced only a drought, South Africa is simultaneously experiencing a drought, crippling water shortages and a power crisis. Each on their own, in combination with a fiscal crisis, has the possibility of wrecking the economy.

All three simultaneously is a veritable disaster. The three together – depending on the government response – may plunge the economy into a recession. So far, official responses to all three crises of drought, power and water shortages have been spectacularly feeble, piece-meal and in-comprehensive.

Failing to speedily tackle the most devastating drought in a century will sabotage South Africa’s public finances.

Mining is both water and energy intensive. Because of water shortage some factories and mines have already postponed new investments, decreased production and/or may close down.

The drought and the water shortage in return exacerbate a power crisis, undermine investment and choke economic growth.

President Jacob Zuma and Agriculture Minister Senzeni Zokwana have both said the drought is not a national disaster. In November last year, when still minister of Cooperative Governance, Pravin Gordhan said the water shortage was not a crisis because it could be “managed”.

It appears that many ANC and government leaders and officials do not understand how the drought would unleash cross-cutting devastation across the economy.

The drought will mean the agriculture sector shrinks – and with it jobs, investments and foreign currency. It is likely to increase food prices, which in turn reduce disposable income of consumers. Consumer spending has fueled growth the past years.

The rising public debt, inflationary pressures and currency volatility has meant that the authorities are tightening fiscal and monetary policy – which of course is meant to stabilise the economic crisis, but will instead undermine growth, unless simultaneous structural and political reforms take place.

One of the structural challenges is that there is little coordination of economic policy in South Africa. For example, administrative prices – the price of public services and goods, are allowed to rise steeply, even if it may undermine the rest of the economy, by deterring investment, job creation and household spending.

Many state utilities, municipalities and state-owned enterprises are now raising prices far above inflation, compounding the economic hardships of many households and companies who are already struggling because of the dire economy.

But above inflation administrative price increases will push up inflation, and inevitably reduce consumer spending.

The Reserve Bank last week raised the repurchase rate 50 basis points to 6.75%, taking the prime rate banks charge customers to 10.25%. While it is meant to tackle rising inflation, it at the same time makes it difficult for business and consumers to service their debts, reduce their investment and spending income – which in itself undermines growth again.

One problem is that South Africa is now in a spot where both fiscal and monetary policy changes on their own cannot stimulate growth. The country needs simultaneous structural and political reforms.

Although Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan has committed himself to “to restoring credibility in our fiscal path”, many of the solutions are political, and lie outside his domain of control.

Public debt is estimated to be at about 42.5% of GDP by March 2016 – the highest since the mid-1980s. Around 10% of the public debt is foreign-currency-denominated debt. The structural problem is that a large proportion of the rising public debt is not incurred for productive investments, but often on patronage, pork-barrel projects, or is wasted through seemingly never-ending mismanagement, inefficiency and corruption.

A big part of South Africa’s economic problems also stem from lack of confidence by the markets in whether the country’s current political leadership has the will, ideas and commitment to change track.

We must now deal with the structural and political problems which undermine growth – to restore confidence. One option would be to continue the current approach: publicly pledge reforms, but in reality only tackling those issues which won’t disturb current patronage and pork-barreling networks of political allies. This of course won’t do.

The other approach would be, with a local government election coming, to be populist: the government publicly stating intentions to curb spending. However, in reality government continues distributing largess to voting constituencies to boost its elections fortunes. This won’t do either.

Another approach would be for the government to become ultra-austere: tightening monetary and fiscal policy further by raising taxes and interest rates. This would kill-off growth.

A better approach would be to honestly implement the current fiscal framework – and holding those accountable who flout it. This will raise confidence. Just cleaning-up the system of waste, inefficiencies and corruption – no matter whether those who are responsible for it are politically connected will free public financial resources.

Ensuring appointments to the public service are based on merit – and making such appointments to key public institutions – will increase efficiency. Reducing public service red tape will be crucial as well.

Stopping pork-barrel infrastructure and ‘development’ projects such as nuclear energy projects will also free up public finances. In addition, the current black economic empowerment model – which empowers politically well-connected political capitalists has to be abolished immediately.

Rather, get businesses to fund education, skills and assets for the poor, and give their employees and surrounding communities BEE stakes in companies – this is a better form of empowerment, and will redistribute resources from small elites to the deserving impoverished masses as well.

It will be important for the state to link all welfare funding to social obligations from the recipient – such as ensuring that their children are in school, and providing industrial and society-relevant skills training for recipients.

Finally, there has to be a better partnership with South Africa’s private sector – to get the private sector to deliver on some projects where the government just does not have the capacity, information or ideas to do so.

South Africa needs to build social pacts between government, the private sector and civil society-based organisations where each group agrees on specific compromises, responsibilities and commitments to get growth going again.

Appointed by the African Union, he joins the team of Presidents Macky Sall of Senegal, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania, Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon, and Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia who together hope to be accepted for talks with the Burundian president.

The issue at heart is that Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza snatched an unconstitutional third term in office last year, predictably incensing the Burundian electorate and spawning an attempted coup and widespread crackdowns. The grim nature of shootings, dismemberings and stabbings in the capital and around the country by the state, and the reprisals by the communities targeted, have caused 240,000 people to take flight to Rwanda, Tanzania and beyond – routes the Burundian people are well used to travelling. The threat of civil war now looms large once more.

Little reported outside the continent, overshadowed perhaps by the 1 million person death toll borne by its neighbour Rwanda, the Burundian civil war from 1993 – 2005 between Hutus and Tutsis saw 300,000 lives lost. To put this in further context, a number that still makes it 100,000 people greater than the toll from the Balkan conflict in the 1990s.

Commentators have tried to allay fears by saying that the current crisis is political and not divided along ethnic lines, and it is to be hoped that it remains so, however Amnesty International have now published satellite images they believe to be of mass graves close to where killings in December took place. There is also credible, United Nations, evidence to suggest that Burundian refugees in Rwanda are being recruited and trained with the aim of ousting President Nkurunziza.

Although the origins of the crisis may have originated in Nkurunziza’s ‘third termism’; massive displacement, familiar feelings of terror and access to accurate information do not mean it will stay that way. In a country where virtually all free media has been shut down, rumours in refugee camps and villages spread like wildfire and there have already been reports of instances of hate speech re-emerging.

Perhaps President Zuma’s willingness to participate in the delegation is because he already understands that Burundi’s implosion once more into civil war has massive repercussions for the rest of the continent. Africa, and indeed the world, cannot manage another civil war. Such a scenario would mean:

• Increased tensions, ethnic or otherwise, in neighbouring countries and a de-stabilising effect across the region.
• Massive international funding required to support the displaced which is unlikely to be available given current humanitarian situations elsewhere.
• Increased flows of asylum seekers across the continent, leading to increased strain on resources and perceived strains on informal labour sectors, perhaps, particularly in the South African context, leading to a reoccurrence of xenophobic violence.
• The acute human suffering and shame, should another genocide taking place on the continent.

It would be very timely if Africa could halt this worsening situation in its tracks. There is also a growing movement on the continent at the movement to exit the ICC. The underpinning seems to be that certain African nations do not want the world’s policing or investigations into their war crimes and crimes against humanity to continue. If that is the case, then the AU needs to show the people of the continent, and mostly importantly these voiceless Burundians, that it can investigate crimes that take place on its soil effectively itself.

However attempts by the AU, along with those of the UN, have so far been rebuffed: UN Security Council envoys that flew in in January with offers of help to halt the violence were rejected by Nkurunziza, while an AU proposal to send in 5000 peacekeepers was labelled as an ‘invasion’.

Nkurunziza’s behaviour would indicate that he feels threatened and wants to be seen as a strong man impervious to offers of foreign assistance, particularly if it is un-African. His refusal to allow investigators in would also indicate he has something to hide and fits the profile of an isolationist leader who needs handling with the upmost care.

This high level delegation, if accepted by President Nkurunziza, must therefore find a way to convey the enormity of the crisis Burundi faces, and either advise Nkurunziza on how to save face and defuse the escalating tensions in his country, or step down. If they do not, the Burundian people slip further towards a violent future.

Major massacres in the country have already taken place in 1965, 1972, 1988, and 1993. The second poorest country in the world with a life expectancy of 50 years old; Burundi is a country already on its knees. Its people have little agency, no free press, virtually no free speech and a non-existent economy. Thousands of Burundians have been born in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, and will move through life without the education and skill to take on the running of their country, while others will have to live with the associated psychological traumas of witnessing mass killings and violence for the rest of their lives.

As neighbouring Yoweri Museveni extends his thirty years in office and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame tries to lift the cap on constitutional term limits, advice from a high level delegation to Nkurunziza to step down would also send a loud message against ‘third (or in Museveni’s case, infinite?) termism’. Experience tells us that the longer you leave people in power, the more autocratic they become and the less likely a democratic and peaceful transition to follow.

If accepted, Jacob Zuma and his team of African Presidents must make this high level delegation to Burundi an effective one. It is in the interests of the frightened Burundian people and the rest of the continent that they do.

*This article was published in SABC Online News. To view the article on their website click here.